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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL ENGLISH, as Personal
Representative of the Estate
of ROBERT ENGLISH,

"p'? ^ w,r

Case No. 890281

Plaintiff/Appellant,
Priority No.

v.

13(b)

ALBERT KIENKE,
Defendant/Respondent.

SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Date of Final Judgment - June 2, 1989
Case No. 880236-CA

FRED R. SILVESTER, Esq. (#3862)
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, Esq. (#4658)
CLAUDIA F. BERRY, Esq. (#5037)
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Counsel for Appellant
700 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Telephone: 801/532-7300
AARON ALMA NELSON, Esq. (#2379)
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY
Counsel for Respondent
136 South Main #910
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
ALLAN L. LARSON, Esq. (#1896)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Co-Counsel for Respondent
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

U

Counsel

for Appellant

Daniel

English

submits the

enclosed pleadings and authorities to assist the Court in its
decision in this action:
1. Memorandum Decision of the trial court and Opinion
of the Utah Court of Appeals improperly omitted from Appellant's
Brief;
2.

Citations requested by the Court regarding repair

work as "part or process" in the trade or business of apartment
rental•
(a)

Sorenson v. Industrial Commission, 598 P.2d 362

(Utah 1979); cited with approval in Board of Education of Alpine
School Dist. v, Olsen, 684 P.2d 49, 52 (Utah 1984); and
(b)

Summerville v« Industrial Commission, 113 Utah

507, 196 P.2d 718 (1948), cited with approval in Sorenson.
3. The statutory citation for the "casual" employment
exception is Utah Code Ann. §35-1-43(1)(b) (1953, as amended
1985) .
DATED this

day of February, 1990.

FIRED R. SIL^S'TER, Esq.
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, Esq.
CLAUDIA F. BERRY, Esq.
of and for
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Supplemental Authorities were mailed/ postage prepaid
thereon, this

/ y day of February, 1990, to:
AARON ALMA NELSON, Esq.
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY
Counsel for Respondent
136 South Main #910
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
ALLAN L. LARSON, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Co-Counsel for Respondent
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City,

(CFB14.5)
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
—OOOoo—

Daniel English, as Personal
Representative of the Estate
of Robert English,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

OPINION
(For Publication)
Case No* 880236-CA

v.
Albert Kienke,
Defendant and Respondent.

FILED
• p i 04889

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable David S. Young

rccooftn
coo«n
*>• Court
Iff Of Afi9«*lB

Attorneys:

Fred R. Silvester, Charles P. Sampson, and Claudia
Berry, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Aaron Alma Nelson and Allan L. Larson, Salt Lake
City, for Respondent

Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Orme.
BENCH, Judge:
Plaintiff appeals entry of summary judgment for defendant in
a wrongful death action. We affirm, finding no error in the
trial court's determination that plaintiffs decedent was liable
as a matter of law for the dangerous condition which he created
and which resulted in his death.
On January 4, 1986, 28-year-old graduate student Robert
English was killed in a tragic accident while rebuilding the
front porch of his leased house at 1031 Windsor Street, Salt
Lake City. Temporary supports placed under the roof of the
porch by the decedent gave way, causing the roof to fall onto
him.
Plaintiff Daniel English, personal representative of
decedent's estate, filed a negligence action against the
property owner, defendant Albert Kienke* The record shows that
defendant/ by oral agreement, permitted the decedent to live in

the house rent-free in exchange for decedent's labor in making
repairs to the house. Although defendant had told decedent the
front porch needed repair, decedent planned and executed the
work himself, and defendant supplied or paid for the materials.
Plaintiff filed two motions for partial summary judgment on
the issue of whether an employee-employer relationship existed
between the parties, and defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment. In a memorandum decision, the district court found
that the decedent had created the dangerous condition which
killed him, and that he was an "independent contractor" under
workers9 compensation law. The trial court entered summary
judgment for defendant and denied plaintiff*s motions.
Plaintiff claims on appeal that entry of summary judgment
for defendant is in error, contending that there are unresolved
factual issues involving the reasonableness of the risk of harm
and whether the dangerous condition of the porch was within
defendant's knowledge. Plaintiff notes that "[w]hether an
unreasonable risk of harm exist[s] is a determination of fact to
be made by the jury." Wagoner v. Waterslide Inc..
744 P.2d
1012, 1013 (Utah App. 1987).
Summary judgment may be granted whenever the trial court
determines that "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Our analytical standard
for review of a summary judgment is the same as that of the
trial court: we review the facts and inferences from those
facts in the light most favorable to the losing party. Seftel
v. Capital Citv Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah App. 1989). If we
conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists, the
summary judgment will be overturned and the case remanded for
further proceedings on that issue. I&. Where no material facts
remain unresolved, .we examine the trial court's conclusions of
law and review them for correctness. Bonham v. Morgan, 102 Utah
Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (1989) (per curiam).
We note that summary judgment should be granted with great
caution where negligence is alleged. Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v.
Oifinsx, 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985). This is because
"[i]ssues of negligence ordinarily present questions of fact to
be resolved by the fact finder." I£. "It is only when the
facts are undisputed and but one reasonable conclusion can be
drawn therefrom that such issues become questions of law." I&.
Accordingly, summary judgment is reserved for only the most
clear-cut negligence cases. Ingram v. Salt Lake Citv, 733 P.2d
126, 126 (Utah 1987) (per curiam),fififi,a^g., Webster v. Sill.
675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983) (summary judgment affirmed for
landlord where tenant was injured while mowing lawn in exchange
for rent reduction).

The trial court granted summary judgment for defendant,
relying on the holding of Steele v. Denver & Rio Grande Western
R.R. Co., 16 Utah 2d 127, 396 P.2d 751 (1964). Sisals., however,
was decided on the basis of the duty owed by a landowner to an
"invitee." This is consistent with the common law notion that
the duty of care owed to a person injured on another's property
depended on whether the injured party was classified as an
invitee, licensee, or trespasser. Gregory v. Fourthwest inv..
Ltd.. 754 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah App. 1988).
Utah has now abandoned these artificial common law
categories, and expanded the landlord's common law duty. Id.
It is, therefore, unnecessary to wrestle with the issue of
whether at the time of the accident decedent could best be
described as a "licensee" or "invitee." Rather, we now impose
upon landowners "a duty to exercise reasonable care toward their
tenants in all circumstances." Id. (quoting Williams v. Melby.
699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985)). That duty of reasonable care
encompasses care to assure their property is "reasonably safe
and suitable for intended uses." Stephenson v. Warner. 581 P.2d
567, 568 (Utah 1978). Landowners may be liable for injuries
caused by dangerous conditions which they create, and which they
should reasonably foresee would expose others to an unreasonable
risk of harm. Id. Landowners are not liable, however, if
tenants fail to keep the premises "reasonably safe and in good
repair." Id* Moreover, tenants are liable for any dangerous
condition on the premises which they create or permit to come
into existence after they have taken possession. Id. at 568-69;
£££ generally. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 355 (1965).
In granting summary judgment to defendant, the trial court
apparently considered the pleadings, answers to defendant's
interrogatories, and the depositions of the parties.1 The
trial court then determined that "the decedent created the risk
by removing the foundational support for the porch," a
conclusion clearly supported by the record. It is.clear that
decedent did all of the porch reconstruction himself, and was so
engaged when the accident occurred. It is also .clear that
decedent placed temporary supports under the roo'f and did so
without the assistance of the defendant. None of these material
facts were disputed. Accordingly, only one reasonable
conclusion can be drawn—decedent created the dangerous
1. We can only presume that the trial court did not consider
other depositions in the record since the court never referred
to them and they were filed after the date of summary judgment.
Depositions not considered below may not be considered on
appeal. Sfift Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity and Guar. Ins.
Underwriters. Inc.. 14 Utah 2d 169, 380 P.2d 135 (1963);
Rosander v. Larsen. 14 Utah 2d 1, 376 P.2d 146 (1962).

condition that caused his own death*
We find no error in the trial court's ruling that it was the
decedent, not the defendant, who was negligent as a matter of
law. Stephenson established that the tenant who creates a
dangerous condition is responsible for his own injury. Id* at
568-69. Although the trial court did not cite Stephenson as the
legal basis for its decision, we may affirm the trial court on
any proper legal basis. Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd.. 104
Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 7 (1989); Tavlor v. Estate of Tavlor, 770 P.2d
163, 169 (Utah App. 1989).
Plaintiff further characterizes the relationship between
defendant and the decedent as one of employer-employee, and
claims that the trial court erred in finding otherwise.
Plaintiff seeks resolution of this issue in his favor in order
to impose a statutory duty upon defendant to provide a safe
workplace. Sfifl Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-12 (1988). If defendant
was deemed to be an employer and failed to secure workers*
compensation protection for the decedent, plaintiff could also
seek certain statutory penalties against defendant. £££ Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-57 (permitting civil actions by injured
employees against such employers where injury is "caused by the
wrongful act, neglect or default of the employer"). Since it is
conclusive as a matter of law, however, that decedent, not
defendant, was the negligent party, we need not reach the issue
of statutory employment. Sfift Peterson V« Sorensen* 91 Utah 507,
65 P.2d 12, 16 (1937) (noncompliance with workers9 compensation
act does not justify recovery for negligence charged but not
proven).
Summary judgment for defendant is affirmed.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Gregory K* Orrae, Judge

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DANIEL ENGLISH, as Executor
:
of the Estate of ROBERT ENGLISH,
:
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO. C-86-1792

vs.
ALBERT KIENKE,
Defendant4

The above-entitled matter came on for consideration by the
Court on the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court

heard the argument of the respective attorneys, and based upon
the arguments and the filed Memoranda, both in support and in
opposition, the Court makes this its
MEMORANDUM DECISION
The Court finds that the provisions of Section 342 of the
Restatement of Torts, as discussed further in the case of Steel
v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railway Co., 396 P.2d 751, 16 Utah
2d 127 (1964), require the Court to conclude that the Motion for
Summary Judgment on behalf of the defendant should be granted.
The Court finds that in the critical language related to the
requirements of a landowner to a licensee there must be met,
prior to liability, the following conditions:
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(a) The possessor knows or has reason to know of
the condition and should realize that it involves an
unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees, and should
expect that they will not discover or realize the
danger, and
(b) He fails to exercise reasonable care to make
the condition safe, and/or to warn the licensee of the
condition and the risk involved, and
(c) The licensees do not know or have reason to
know of the condition and the risk involved.
The Court finds under the circumstances of this case that
reasonable minds could not differ in the obligation expected of
the defendant to recognize the risk.

First, the Court finds that

the

removing

decedent

created

the

risk

by

the

foundational

support for the porch, and second, that he did so without the
approval

of the defendant.

Certainly

the decedent would

be

charged with perceiving the risk at a level at least equal to or
greater than that required of the defendant.

When the defendant

came by the residential property and observed the changes created
by the decedent, the defendant had no greater responsibility to
perceive the risk than that of the decedent.
The

Court

cannot

find

that

the

defendant

should

have

realized that the circumstances involved a "unreasonable risk of
harm" to the licensee, and that the defendant ". . . should
expect that they [the decedent] will not discover or realize the
danger."

The Court cannot find that the defendant had a greater

responsibility

to

inform

the

decedent

of

decedent should have perceived on his own.

the

risk than

the
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Further, the Court cannot find that the defendant failed to
exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, nor that the
decedent could not know, or have reason to know of the condition
and the relative risk.
Based

that

the

defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.

The

Court

upon

further

contractor,

the

finds

and

not

foregoing,

that
an

the

the

Court

decedent

employee

under

finds

was

an

the

independent

Utah

Workers

Compensation Act, and finally, based upon the foregoing, the
Court cannot find any basis upon which punitive damages could be
awarded.

Thus, the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is

granted in each particular.
Dated this

3/

dav of August, 1987.

DAVID S./YOUNG
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the

foregoing

following, this

Memorandum
/

Decision,

postage

prepaid,

day of.-Augurt, 1987:

Fred R. Silvester
Michael W. Homer
Attorneys for Plaintiff
175 S. West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Aaron Alma Nelson
Attorney for Defendant
1300 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Philip R. Fishier
Co-counsel for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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